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PORTRAIT: ANN TAVES 
From Weird Experiences to Revelatory Events 
Ann Taves 
 
As the first invitee to this Portrait section trained as a scholar of religion and situated in a 
department of religious studies, I was interested to see how previous scholars trained in 
anthropology and sociology positioned themselves in relation to “religion” as an object of study. 
It seems we all do so gingerly. Although I was trained as a historian of Christianity with a 
specialization in American religious history, I have self-consciously positioned my historical 
research in an interdisciplinary space between psychiatry, anthropology, and religious studies 
since the early nineties in order to study the contestations surrounding unusual experiences. 
During the last decade, I have been identifying myself less as a historian and more as an 
interdisciplinary scholar attempting to bring both humanistic and cognitive social scientific 
methods to the study of historical experiences and events. From this vantage point, I would 
argue—like Bloch (Volume 1, 2010)—that “religion” is not a natural kind, but a complex 
cultural concept; that a theory of “religion” per se is impossible; and, in keeping with the way 
Bloch positions himself as studying ritual as a form of communication, I would position myself 
as studying how people appraise experiences and, more recently, events. Like Kapferer (Volume 
4, 2013, I am interested in the light that religion can shed on more general processes, specifically 
the appraisal of events at various levels of analysis and the role of unusual experiences in the 
emergence of new social formations.    
Background 
I came to these views and questions over time from a non-religious upbringing in a culturally 
Protestant American family, which left me alternately fascinated and puzzled by intense forms of 
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religiosity. In college, a course on theories of religion impressed me with the seriousness of both 
religious thought and thought about religion and led me—in typical baby-boomer fashion—to try 
out any number of religious options during the next several decades. Had I thought of myself as 
an ethnographer, I could have construed this process as fieldwork, though anthropologists would 
rightly have accused me of “going native” way too many times. But through these explorations, 
my indigenous secularism never entirely left me and that, coupled with a year in medical school 
before I decided to focus on religion, most likely laid the groundwork for entering empathetically 
into diverse religious and spiritual perspectives and—at the same time—attempting to explain 
them from a naturalistic point of view.   
As a graduate student in the history of Christianity and American religion at the 
University of Chicago Divinity School I took the sorts of theory courses that had drawn me to 
the study of religion in the first place, while at the same time focusing my research on practices, 
such as Catholic devotion to consecrated wafers and Jesus’s bodily wounds, that were foreign to 
me. The theory courses repeatedly returned to Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, but also to Anthony 
Giddens in social theory and Turner, Spiro, Geertz, and Ricoeur on symbols. My dissertation on 
changes in nineteenth century Catholic devotional practices integrated a bit of anthropological 
theory (Turner and Spiro on the bi-valence of symbols), but mindful of the advice of my 
dissertation committee – Jerald Brauer and Martin Marty – and the general ethos of religious 
studies in those days, I shied away from trying to explain experience in naturalistic terms. When 
I was hired to teach American religious history—not theory—at a Methodist theological school, I 
delved into Methodist history and discovered that its rapid expansion was fueled by unusual 
experiences. In class I skimmed over that material quickly, not knowing how to make sense of it.   
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Having no explanation for such experiences and having been encouraged in any event to 
avoid “reductionism,” I set aside issues of experience and explanation, focusing instead on the 
role of piety and practice in the lives of ordinary people: first immigrant Catholics, then 
Protestant women. Then in the late eighties, when a friend shared her experiences of lost time 
and alternate selves at the height of the multiple personality (MPD) “epidemic,” her sincerity 
opened a new world of interpretive possibilities. Comparisons soon came to mind between the 
phenomena associated with MPD in psychiatry, spirit possession and shamanism in 
anthropology, and the experiences of early Methodists and others in the history of Christianity. 
This insight galvanized my career, reshaped my research agenda, and provided me with a cross-
disciplinary framework within which I could combine my love of theory and my fascination with 
unusual experiences. In retrospect, the idea of “multiple personality” also offered a guiding 
metaphor for thinking about selves in more fluid terms, for bringing multiple points of view into 
a common conversation and, most recently, for offering naturalistic explanations of experiences 
in my own voice without obscuring the perspectives of those I am studying. 
Experience 
Fits, Trances, and Visions (Princeton, 1999) was the first major fruit of this shift in focus.  It 
traced the historical interplay between experiential forms of religion (mostly Protestant and post-
Protestant in the Anglo-American context) and scientific theories (medical, physiological, 
mesmeric, psychological) generated by insiders and outsiders in order to explain (and for the 
most part discredit) such experiences over the course of two centuries. It began with eighteenth-
century debates over the unusual experiences of Methodists and ended with early twentieth-
century debates over and comparisons between hypnotically induced dissociation in women 
(often very devout) diagnosed with hysteria and the unusual experiences of spiritualist mediums, 
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mystics, and Pentecostals. The historical work led to three key insights: (1) Experiences of this 
sort are unstable and can morph experientially and hermeneutically through suggestion and 
encounters with others who variously explain, condemn, or encourage them. (2) The categories 
used to characterize these experiences, e.g., hysteria, mysticism, spiritual, religious, occult, are 
ideologically laden, theoretically unstable, and difficult to study apart from a history of 
discourse. (3) It is important to figure out how to constitute historical or ethnographic objects of 
study in such a way that our academic categories do not interfere with tracing this morphing of 
experience at the level of discourse (categories and theories) and practice.  
In recognizing that there were similarities between experiences that scholars variously 
characterized as dissociative, shamanistic, and religious, I became aware of the problems created 
by assuming that “religious experience” referred to something clearly defined and stable, rather 
than something that emerged as the result of a complex interpretive process. That insight shifted 
my focus from the historical study of “religious experience” to the study of experiences that 
people or groups explained in very different ways, e.g., an experience that Methodists might 
explain as “falling under the power of the Holy Spirit,” mesmerists might explain as the effect of 
a “mesmeric trance” induced by a powerful preacher, and a physician might explain as 
“catalepsy,” a bodily disorder. This shift in my object of study allowed me to analyze not only 
how individuals’ interpretations of their own experiences changed over time, but also how their 
contemporaries both inside and outside their own immediate social group interpreted their 
experiences.   
While working on Fits, Trances, and Visions, I struggled to constitute my object of study 
and had difficulty explaining to others what the book was about in any positive sense. Having 
already rejected terms such as religious, mystical, visionary, or ecstatic, as modifiers of the 
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experiences in question, I considered alternatives such as trance and dissociation. However, 
because those I was studying also used these terms, adopting any of them aligned me either with 
the explanatory commitments of a present-day discipline or with my historical subjects. To avoid 
such alignments, I constituted my object of study with a more generic description of the sort of 
experiences that interested me. By focusing on “subjects whose usual sense of themselves as 
embodied agents is altered or discontinuous” (Taves 1999: 9), I could then consider how and 
why people characterize, respond to, and in some cases seek to induce these alterations in their 
sense of self.   
As a result of the book, I was invited to write the entry on religious experience for the 
second edition of the Encyclopedia of Religion (Taves 2005). The essay traced the various roles 
that the concept of religious experience has played in modern discourses on religion and the 
controversies that emerged around it beginning in the 1970s. These controversies led scholars of 
religion influenced by the linguistic turn within the humanities to critique “sui generis” notions 
of religious experience, which—they claimed—set religious experience apart from other sorts of 
experiences studied by scholars in the humanities. These critiques, which led scholars of religion 
to reject the study of experience as passé or to study it only as a discursive construct, placed me 
in an odd position. While, on the one hand, I shared their critique of sui generis claims, their 
attempt to explain experience simply in terms of discourse struck me as inherently implausible. 
While my own work so far had focused on the history of discourse about experience, I 
sympathized with past attempts to explain experiences of otherworldly presences in naturalistic 
terms. Moreover, in contrast to most of the critiques of “religious experience,” my work focused 
on explanations of particular kinds of experiences, not experience (religious or otherwise) in 
general. Many of the features of these experiences (e.g., a loss of a sense of self or a sense of 
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another displacing one’s self) recurred in different periods and cultural contexts, where they were 
sometimes considered religious and sometimes not. In my own mind, it seemed clear that such 
experiences could not be explained simply in terms of one factor, whether biological, personal, 
or cultural, but rather provided intriguing contexts for investigating the interplay between them.  
In 2004, prompted by a colleague interested in the newly emerging cognitive approaches 
to the study of religion, I plunged into the scientific literature on dissociation and hypnosis in 
order to reinterpret a turn-of-the-century medium in light of more current scientific research. The 
paper (later published as Taves 2006) sparked lively discussion at the annual meeting of the 
American Academy of Religion, as well as teasing comments about going over to the scientific 
“dark side.” Owing to my focus on experience, the paper led to invitations to give lectures at 
conferences on cognitive science and religion and eventually the decision to tackle the touchy 
issues surrounding the study of religious experience directly in Religious Experience 
Reconsidered: A Building Block Approach to the Study of Religion and Other Special Things 
(Princeton 2009). There I argued that we should disaggregate the concept of “religious 
experience” and study the wide range of experiences to which people have attached religious 
significance. Focusing on the underlying form of particular experiences would allow us to 
compare experiences that shared that feature under different conditions and analyze the processes 
through which particular experiences are perceived, assessed, and valued at various levels from 
the intrapersonal to the intergroup.   
The Ordinary and the Non-Ordinary 
Of the book’s four chapters on religion, experience, explanation, and comparison, the first 
proved to be the most controversial. The controversy arose not in response to the chapter’s 
central claim—that we should recast “religious experience” as “experiences deemed religious”—
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but in response to my attempt to get out of the definitional problems surrounding religion-related 
terms. While I was clear from the outset that attempts to theorize “religion” as an abstract 
concept were problematic, I initially planned to stipulate a second-order definition of the 
adjective “religious” in the usual religious studies fashion. As I drafted the manuscript, however, 
I could find no way to avoid the confusion engendered by the use of diverse and often 
overlapping second-order definitions of (e.g.) “religious,” “magical,” and “sacred” (Taves 2009: 
148-149, 161-162). Not only do stipulative definitions make it hard to distinguish between first 
and second-order use of terms, they make it appear that we are studying the same thing when we 
often are not and obscure common objects of study that we label differently.   
Rather than endlessly working to sort out our different technical uses of these complex 
cultural concepts, I concluded—much as I did in FTV—that my interdisciplinary aims were 
better served by specifying the experiences of interest in broader, more generic terms that would 
allow me to analyze how people characterize and work with the experiences in practice. In light 
of recurrent scholarly references to “special” objects, actions, and beliefs in their attempts to 
define religion, magic, and the sacred, I suggested that studying experiences people mark as 
“special” or “non-ordinary” provided a broader, more generic way to capture experiences of 
interest without presupposing how people interpreted them.   
When I made this suggestion, I had not yet read the work of Ellen Dissanayake (1990: 
92-101), who made much the same suggestion from the vantage point of art history, nor was I 
aware of Bloch’s (2008) article proclaiming “Religion is Nothing Special,” which came out 
about the time RER went to press. As I later clarified (Taves 2010: 176-177), I agree with Bloch 
that “religion is nothing special because, viewed from an evolutionary perspective, it is ‘an 
indissoluble … aspect of human social organization.’” My claim, however, was that “while 
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religion may be nothing special in relation to other cultural activities from which it has belatedly 
been distinguished, specialness is special in so far as making things special [in Dissanayake’s 
sense] is at the heart of cultural activity” (Taves 2010: 177). It is important, however, to 
distinguish between making things special and perceiving things as special or non-ordinary. The 
former is a more distinctly—although undoubtedly not exclusively—human activity and the 
latter a more general biological capacity possessed by many if not most organisms, upon which 
making special is premised, although as I concluded based on two subsequent articles the 
relationship between consciously making and perceiving things as non-ordinary is complex.   
In these two articles (Taves 2013a, 2015), I demonstrated how we could tease apart 
classical definitions of religion to break down “the sacred” and “religion” into more basic 
processes that are involved in making and/or perceiving things as non-ordinary by distinguishing 
between the generic schema that structure a definition and the specific features that mark it as 
“religious.” Taking cues from Durkheim’s definition of sacred things as “things set apart and 
forbidden” and Tillich’s definition of religion as ultimate concern, I recast setting apart as a 
means of making things salient and taboos and claims of ultimacy as means of signaling 
significance. From the early twentieth-century debates between animists, pre-animists, and their 
heirs, I contrasted theorists, such as van der Leeuw and Weber, who explored the range of ways 
that people attach non-ordinary powers (e.g., mana and charisma) to all kinds of things including 
deities, with the Durkheimian tradition, which explored the way that people generate and enter 
into non-ordinary worlds. I recast the non-ordinary powers of the “mana” tradition and non-
ordinary worlds of the Durkheimians in relation to two different aspects of imagination: 
inventiveness, the capacity to generate novelty in response to different environmental 
circumstances, and pretense, the ability to enter mentally in a “pretend” world.  
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These definitional traditions, when teased apart, thus pointed to three core processes that 
link cognition and culture and that, taken together, may be sufficient to account for the extra-
ordinary attributes that classical theorists associated with religion: processes of imagination, 
which allow us to generate both novelties and alternate realities; process of setting apart, which 
single out some things as more salient than others; and processes of valuation, which assess their 
significance and oftentimes rank and order them. I stressed, however, that the three processes do 
not uniquely specify anything as religious or sacred or occult or magical, but rather are core 
processes that people draw upon when they perceive things as non-or-extra-ordinary.  
In a recent exchange, Barrett (2014) critiqued my use of “specialness,” arguing that 
“meaning seems to drop out of her analysis of specialness at the most basic level, leaving behind 
a highly abstract quality whose unconscious ascription is allegedly responsible for the 
‘singularization’ of something as a bearer of special value (Taves, 2009, pp. 481-49).” In my 
response to his target article (Taves 2014), I conceded that I had been using the term less 
frequently, because—like his preferred term “meaning”—it allows us to gloss over important 
distinctions. Just as we can distinguish between semantic meaning, which is descriptive, and 
foundational meaning, which involves value, so too we can use “special” to signify both 
something that is set apart from other things in its class (and, thus, salient) and something that 
has particular value (and, thus, significance). Both ‘‘meaning’’ and ‘‘special’’ are useful terms to 
watch for ‘‘on the ground,’’ so to speak, where they highlight features of interest; but both can 
obscure the distinction between salience and significance if we do not carefully analyze the 
manner in which they (‘‘meaning’’ and ‘‘special’’) are used. 
In light of this distinction, I would say that things that are salient stand out from things in 
their class and are therefore perceived as special (insofar as we want to use that term), in the 
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sense of being non-ordinary. Stimuli may be salient, that is, grab our attention, for many 
different reasons, all of which involve potential value, including potential survival value 
(evolved salience), potential cultural value (learned salience), or simply because they are 
unfamiliar (novel salience) and their potential value is unknown. But salient stimuli have to be 
appraised in relation to the environment (context), past experience, and the goals of the organism 
in order for the organism to determine their significance. 
Broken down in this way, I was able to relate the distinction between ordinary and non-
ordinary to the distinction between intuitive and minimally counterintuitive widely employed in 
the cognitive science of religion (Taves 2015), which to date has been primarily interested in 
identifying and explaining pan-cultural cognitive constraints on religious thought and action. 
Thus, in conceptualizing deities and other culturally postulated superhuman agents as minimally 
counterintuitive (MCI), CSR researchers situated them within a larger class of representations 
that involve violations of pan-cultural ontological categories. In CSR terms, we could say that 
MCI concepts stand out as non-ordinary because they add something unexpected to the way we 
have evolved to predict how things will behave. This makes the concepts more salient than 
things we would expect. If they are rich with possible inferences, we would assess them as 
potentially significant and, most likely, explore and develop the inferences using our 
imagination. Such concepts would, thus, be perceived as non-ordinary across cultures.   
In focusing on universals, however, CSR researchers do not always explicitly stress that 
they are setting aside research on concepts—sometimes referred to as counterschematic—that 
violate cultural or idiosyncratic expectations and, thus, are crucial in accounting for cultural and 
individual differences. Within cultures or between individuals, violations of counterschematic 
concepts would also stand out as non-ordinary. Analysis of the interplay between concepts at 
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these levels promises to provide us with a better understanding of how cultural and individual 
differences emerge.   
When I initially proposed that we think about “specialness” on a continuum from the 
ordinary to the singular, some scholars of religion assumed that I was simply substituting 
“special” for sacred or religious and objected that there are many things people consider special, 
such as their children, that they do not consider sacred.  My goal, as I reiterated in subsequent 
publications (Taves 2010a,b), was to cast a wide net that would capture the range of things 
people consider non-ordinary in order to focus on (a) how and why people perceive some 
experiences as non-ordinary and (b) how and why they understand and respond to such 
experiences (Taves 2013b,c). In doing so, I was continuing my efforts to position the study of 
experience within an interdisciplinary space and, at the same, time elaborating and extending the 
building block approach I advocated in RER.  
A Building Block Approach to Complex Cultural Concepts 
In sketching what I mean by a building block approach and how I gradually extended it to 
include “complex cultural concepts” (CCCs) more generally, I am using “we language” to 
acknowledge my collaboration with Egil Asprem, a scholar of Western Esotericism who came to 
UCSB as a post-doc in order to extend this method to the concept of “esotericism” and work 
with me to further develop it. As we are conceiving them, CCCs are abstract nouns with 
unstable, overlapping, culturally determined meanings that vary within and across cultures and 
adjectival forms, such as religious, spiritual, sacred, magical, superstitious, esoteric, occult, and 
paranormal, that can be used to characterize experiences, practices, objects, etc. We are using 
formations to refer to any social entity, e.g., schools of thought, traditions of practice, social 
movements, social networks, and academic disciplines. CCCs are often built into formations, in 
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which case they take on specialized meanings within and for those formations. The key terms of 
our various disciplines, traditions, and schools of thought all have specialized meanings inside 
these formations. A building block approach (BBA) to CCCs is a method for learning more 
about how formations—and the CCCs that constitute them—emerge and function. It works by 
(1) taking apart the CCCs, that is by disassembling, fractionating, or reverse engineering them 
into more basic components,i and then (2) tracing how people individually or in groups have 
assembled them into various formations. We can break this down into four phases: CCC 
identification and disassembly followed by BB identification and reassembly (for the most recent 
iteration, see Asprem, under review). 
In taking things apart, we distinguish between building blocks, which simply refer to 
components of something more complex and, thus, are always relative to some level of analysis, 
and basic concepts (Sperber 1996, 67-70, 89), which, unlike the CCCs they enable, are 
translatable across cultures because they are grounded in evolved mental architecture and 
embodied interactions with the environment. These concepts tend to fly under our radar because 
we take them for granted, do them automatically, and rely on them continuously.   
Interdisciplinary Study of Anomalous or Unusual Experiences 
We can recast the study of anomalous, unusual, or nonordinary experiences in terms of the BBA. 
Thus, there is a range of disciplinary contexts (formations) in which scholars study unusual or 
anomalous experiences under various headings (CCCs), including shamanism, spirit possession, 
and altered state of consciousness in anthropology; paranormal experiences in parapsychology; 
anomalous experiences within psychology; mystical and religious experience in religious studies; 
and dissociative disorders and psychosis in psychiatry. These disciplinary formations, each with 
their own key terms (CCCs), have frustrated the interdisciplinary study of anomalous or unusual 
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experiences. Although anthropologists have been attempting to overcome this balkanization of 
research for some time, many within psychiatry and religious studies have resisted 
interdisciplinary comparisons on the grounds that some experiences are inherently pathological 
or religious.   
Some psychiatric syndromes, as groups of signs and symptoms, can also be construed as 
CCCs that present difficulties parallel to that of “religious experience” in so far as both tend to 
conflate cultural categories, which carry an assessment or point of view, with the 
phenomenological analysis of form and, thus, stabilize clusters of types of experiences or 
symptoms by definitions rather than common underlying mechanisms. The National Institute of 
Mental Health has recently critiqued the categories in the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual on these grounds and launched a Research Domain Criteria Project to “transform 
diagnosis by incorporating genetics, imaging, cognitive science and other levels of information 
in order to lay the foundation for a new classification system” (Insel 2013).
Labeling “symptom clusters” by definition rather than by underlying mechanisms has 
resulted in the over-association of a wide range of seemingly involuntary experiences that are 
common in the general population with psychopathology. Thus, phenomenologically similar 
types of experiences that people do not feel that they willed, intended, or caused, appear in lists 
of anomalous, parapsychological, and religious experiences, as well as psychotic and dissociative 
disorders. The many scales devoted to experiences of various sorts suffer from the same 
difficulty. Thus, there are scales devoted to mystical, spiritual, transliminal, kundalini, near 
death, and paranormal experiences, as well as scales that focus on anomalous experiences, 
creative experiences, dissociative experiences, and schizotypy (or unusual experiences). Even 
 14 
 
though each scale seems to assume that it is measuring something different, the scales share 
many questions in common.   
The Appraisal of Anomalous Experiences Interview (AANEX; Brett et al. 2007), 
developed by Emmanuelle Peters and her team of psychosis researchers at King’s College, 
London, is markedly different. Since they are very aware that there are people in the general 
population who have unusual experiences who do not experience distress, never seek clinical 
help, and may indeed value and cultivate unusual experiences, they developed an interview 
protocol that allowed them to compare those who do seek help with those who do not. Studies 
using the AANEX interview are finding significant differences in the way that clinical and non-
clinical populations appraise their unusual experiences (Brett et al. 2009). This suggests that 
appraisal processes interact with other variables, e.g., schizotypal tendencies, and play a crucial 
role not only in determining how unusual experiences are categorized but also how people 
respond to them and, thus, whether they disturb, enhance, or have no particular effect on 
people’s lives.  
A building block approach to unusual experiences therefore allows us to distinguish 
between sensations and perceptions and the way they are appraised and, thus, to set up 
comparisons based on these components rather than on the experience as a whole. The chief 
difficulty with categorical views of psychotic experiences and sui generis views of religious 
experience(s) is that they insist on treating experiences as wholes and rule out—a priori— 
the comparisons that would allow us to (a) identify component processes and underlying 
mechanisms and (b) investigate how the interactions between them effect outcomes clinically, 
ethnographically, and historically. 
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Events 
The chapter in RER on experience, which situated experiences people consider religious in the 
context of experience more generally, was a significant step forward, but left me unsure how to 
characterize the relationship between “experience” and “experiences” in cognitive terms. The 
chapter on explanation, which relied heavily on recent developments in attributional theory 
(Malle 2004), argued for the importance of integrating unconscious appraisal processes into a 
multi-level explanation of how people attribute meaning to their experiences, but left much 
underdeveloped, both theoretically and practically.   
In more recent work (Taves and Asprem, under review), we argue that situating 
experience and experiences in relation to research on event cognition allows us to conceptualize 
the relationship between “experience” and “experiences” in more precise cognitive, information-
processing terms. Event cognition is premised on the observation that we continually segment 
the flow of information into chunks, creating “event boundaries” and, within those boundaries, 
“events” (Radvansky and Zacks 2011; 2014: 29-31). Thus, in cognitive, information-processing 
terms, “experience” (in the abstract) refers to the flow of information in so far as we are aware of 
it, whereas “experiences” (in the plural) refers to events that are segmented out of the flow of 
experience such that each experience is perceived to have a beginning and an end. What we refer 
to colloquially as “experiences” are simply personally experienced events that are particularly 
salient.  
If, as the research on event cognition suggests, humans rely on what cognitive 
psychologists refer to as “event models” when verbalizing event narratives, events offer a 
platform for integrating theoretical work on framing processes (Goffman 1974), which 
sociologists have elaborated in relation to social movements (Johnson and Noakes 2005), as well 
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as attributional processes (Spilka et al. 1985), which social psychologists have elaborated in 
relation to dyadic interactions (Malle 2004) with the unconscious appraisal processes that 
cognitive psychologists elaborate within a predictive coding framework.   
This more integrated approach has significant implications for historians and 
ethnographers. First, it allows us to better understand the relationship between “original” 
experiences and later narratives by recognizing that post-hoc narratives rely not on the original 
event model (also known as the “working model”) but on an event model (the remembered 
event) generated at the time of narration. This means that historical or ethnographic 
reconstructions of experience events must proceed in two steps, moving first from a public event 
narrative to the hypothetical mental representation of the event at the time of narration, and 
second from this mental event to a hypothetical earlier working model of the initial event, 
whether internally or externally generated. The insertion of a hypothetical mental model at both 
points in the process does not make the historian or ethnographer’s reconstructive task easier or 
more certain, but reminds us that the narration of experiences, however immediate, is always 
post-hoc and, thus, always constitutes a new event in which memory and context interact anew 
and, thus, a new data point in the reconstruction of historical processes.  
Second, it allows us to understand how various features including background knowledge 
(i.e., memory and “culture”) and appraisals (i.e., intentions and causes) can be incorporated into 
experiences unconsciously and unreflectively (i.e., in the context of the experience event itself) 
rather than simply attributed post hoc, and, once they are perceived, determine what else we 
perceive as relevant in an event. This means that even at the level of the event model, events are 
represented partially and from the subject’s point of view and, thus, do not provide an objective 
view from nowhere.   
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Third, because the causal frameworks embedded in event models are generated through 
the appraisals of cues that the subject senses and perceives in their environment and within 
themselves, the cues themselves are often represented in event narratives along with tacit and 
explicit appraisals. Drawing inspiration from Malle’s (2004) analyses of how people explain 
events (Taves 2009: 100-111), we can use this distinction between cues and appraisals to divide 
a detailed narrative event into sub-events by asking “what happened” and “why it happened” 
from the point of view of the narrator as the event narrative unfolds. In many cases, this allows 
us to tease apart the cues that the subject senses or perceives (“what happened”) from the causes 
or reasons they implicitly or explicitly give for them (“why it happened”).  
Although teasing these processes apart in historical and ethnographic narratives is 
conjectural and highly dependent on the nature of our sources, these distinctions allow us to take 
a more rigorous approach. If we only have one account and it is narrated long after the event, it 
may be impossible to distinguish appraisals that were built into the initial event from later 
reflections on the event. If we have multiple accounts of the same event recounted at different 
points in time, we can compare the versions by dividing the event into sub-events and 
interweaving the accounts so that we can compare the sub-events. Depicting the analysis in 
charts allows us to see what sub-events were added or deleted as the narrative was retold and 
analyze to what extent the narrator altered the way they described the sub-events over time. 
When the description of “what happened” remains stable across accounts, this allows us to 
identify a plausible early representation of the sensory cues that comprised the original event 
model. If some portions of the reasons they offer to explain the cues remain stable over time, this 
suggests that those reasons may have been closely connected to the initial unconscious appraisal 
of the event. Reasons that change over time likely represent the subject’s more conscious 
 18 
 
reflections on the experience and, thus, can be analyzed in relation to the context in which the 
narrative was retold (for an elaboration on this method in relation to case studies, see Taves, 
forthcoming; Taves and Harper, forthcoming).  
Revelatory Events 
These lines of research come together in my most recent work Revelatory Events: Experiences 
and Appraisals in the Emergence of New Spiritual Paths (Taves, forthcoming), in which I 
analyze the role that unusual experiences played in the emergence of three spiritual paths 
(Mormonism, Alcoholics Anonymous, and A Course in Miracles) that generated very different 
social forms (a church, a self-help movement, and a network of students). Part I devotes three 
chapters each to the descriptive analysis of the role of experience in the process of emergence 
reconstructed from the point of view of participants (whether as followers or critics) as events 
unfolded based on the best real-time historical sources. Part II compares the three movements in 
order to explain their emergence as a creative process involving unusual abilities, small group 
interactions, and underlying motivations. In separating the descriptive reconstructions in Part I 
from the naturalistic explanations in Part II, I am differentiating between the reconstructive task 
of the historian who seeks to portray events from the point of view of historical actors and the 
social scientist who seeks to explain events from a naturalistic point of view. Taken together, the 
two parts offer a historically grounded study of the way people cultivate experiences and 
adjudicate their meanings over time and a comparative study that juxtaposes multiple 
explanatory points of view, including my own. At a personal level, it returns to the issues that 
drew me into the study of religion in the first place and to issues of voice and the interplay of 
voices that have preoccupied me since the eighties. 
 19 
 
Theoretically, this project builds on my previous research, placing the process whereby 
people determine how experiences should be interpreted or categorized at the center and, thus, is 
situated in an interdisciplinary space that does not presuppose how the experiences or the 
formations that result from them will be categorized. In keeping with the theoretical work just 
discussed, it takes experience-related events in which it seemed to people as if an “other” were 
present as its stipulated point of analogy. Thus, while Lewis (2003) made a forceful case for 
studying the role of religious experience in the context of new religious movements, this study 
offers a broad theoretical framework for analyzing the role of “presence” experiences in the 
emergence of new social formations. This broader, more generic terminology allows us to apply 
the methods used here to new social formations regardless of how they characterize themselves.  
In keeping with this open-ended framework, I do not assume that the key subjects— 
Joseph Smith, Bill Wilson, or Helen Schucman—were psychotic, delusional, or consciously 
deceptive, although critics have often characterized Joseph Smith in particular in that way.  
Instead, recognizing that we cannot rule out these possibilities entirely, I take up the more 
interesting challenge of explaining how they and their immediate followers might have sincerely 
believed (e.g.) in the existence of ancient golden plates, in the curative effects of a Higher Power, 
or that an internal voice was that of Jesus. Thus, in Part II, the chapter on “abilities” seeks to 
explain how Joseph Smith and Helen Schucman were able to dictate complex texts in a manner 
that convinced their followers that they were not the authors. The chapter first compares what it 
was like for Smith to “translate” the golden plates, while looking not at the plates but at a seer 
stone placed in a hat to block out the light, and Schucman to “hear” the words of the internal 
voice, which she “scribed” in shorthand and then dictated to a colleague.  It then compares their 
abilities with those of highly hypnotizable subjects and novelists to ask how we generate 
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alternative first person selves that we sometimes view as real. The chapter on “interactions” 
focuses on the way in which the key subjects and their close collaborators frame their 
experiences in terms of otherworldly entities and powers, finding that in each case the groups 
developed agreed upon procedures that allowed them to be guided by the otherworldly entities 
along a path that the individuals within the group did not consciously envision. The final chapter 
on motivations takes a cognitive approach to goal-directed action that allows us to conceive of 
these otherworldly entities as split-off (non-conscious) aspects of individuals that were not only 
recognized by but motivated to think for the emergent small group as a whole.   
The book can be read in several different ways: as an account of the role that “presence” 
experiences played in the emergence of the three social formations; as an illustration of methods 
that can be used to reconstruct the role of experiences in the emergence of new social formations; 
and as an explanation of the emergence of spiritual paths whose origins were attributed to 
guidance by otherworldly sources. Read in the first way, it is intended as a contribution to the 
study of emergent social formations that does not presuppose the final form that they took, but 
focuses instead on how key participants perceived the process as it unfolded. Read in the second 
way, it is intended to demonstrate how comparisons grounded in basic concepts—in this case 
“events” and “paths”—can revitalize comparative work and generate a more nuanced basis for 
explaining the processes involved. Read in the third way, it is intended as a contribution to 
creativity studies that draws from evolutionary psychology and the cognitive social sciences to 
better understand instances in which creative authority is attributed to otherworldly sources.  
Ann Taves 
Department of Religious Studies 
University of California at Santa Barbara 
Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3130 
taves@religion.ucsb.edu 
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i Some anthropologists have used the term “fractionating” to identify “cognitively and 
behaviorally universal patterns” that are associated with a “folk category” such as “ritual” or 
“religion” or what we prefer to call CCCs (Whitehouse and Lanman 2014: 675; Boyer and 
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Bergstrom 2008: 119). Although we have no objection to the term “fractionating,” we are not 
just searching for universals. We prefer reverse engineering because it is a term that is widely 
used for the process of taking apart something complicated in order to see how it was put 
together and, thus, envisions the reassembly side of the BBA.   
